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Abstract. This paper criticizes one of the premises of Schellenberg’s atheistic 
argument from divine hiddenness. This premise, which can be considered as 
the foundation of his proposed argument, is based on a specific interpretation of 
divine love as eros. In this paper I first categorize several concepts of divine love 
under two main categories, eros and agape; I then answer some main objections 
to the ascription of eros to God; and in the last part I  show that neither on 
a  reading of divine love as agape nor as eros can Schellenberg’s argument be 
construed as sound. My aim is to show that even if – contra Nygren for example – 
we accept that divine love can be interpreted as eros, Schellenberg’s argument 
still doesn’t work
I. THE ARGUMENT FROM DIVINE HIDDENNESS
Many people are perplexed that God should permit a  situation in 
which many human beings live in incomprehension and bewilderment 
regarding His existence, while all the time He could save humanity from 
such a  predicament. The problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ refers to the 
problem for the theist in holding that we human beings live in a world in 
which we have limited cognitive faculties; knowledge of God is essential 
for our flourishing in this-worldly and otherworldly life; and where, in 
addition, God, the omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly loving, has 
permitted us to live in this bewilderment and perplexity regarding His 
attributes and existence, all the while knowing that it is essential for our 
well-being.
102 EBRAHIM AZADEGAN
More than anyone else, John Schellenberg is responsible for renewing 
and framing the contemporary debate about divine hiddenness.1 Roughly 
speaking, he sees the fact that there are some non-resistant non-believers 
as being incompatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God.
The final version of his argument is as follows:
(1) Necessarily, if God exists, anyone who is (i) not resisting God and 
(ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with God is also 
(iii) in a position to participate in such relationship (able to do so 
just by trying).
(2) Necessarily, one is at a  time in a  position to participate in 
meaningful conscious relationship with God only if at that time 
one believes that God exists.
(3) Thus (from 1 and 2), necessarily, if God exists, anyone who is 
(i) not resisting God and (ii) capable of meaningful conscious 
relationship with God also (iii) believes that God exists.
(4) There are (and often have been) people who are (i) not resisting 
God and (ii) capable of meaningful conscious relationship with 
God without also (iii) believing that God exists.
(5) Thus (from conjunction of 3 and 4) God does not exist.2
Premise 1 of his argument is the most important premise, and of course 
requires a separate argument. To support premise 1 Schellenberg argues 
that if God is loving, He seeks an explicit reciprocal relationship with 
us, involving not only such things as divine guidance, support, and 
forgiveness, but also what leads to the faith, trust, obedience, and worship 
that would contribute to human well-being. He therefore concludes that 
if God seeks a reciprocal relationship, then for any human person H at 
any time t, if H is at t capable of relating personally with God, H at t is in 
a position to do so just by choosing.
1 Schellenberg’s main discussions of this subject can be found in John L. Schellenberg, 
Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
and ‘What the Hiddenness of God Reveals: A  Collaborative Discussion’, in Divine 
Hiddenness: New Essays, ed. D. Howard-Snyder and P.K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 33-61. He responds to several objections to his argument 
in ‘The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (I)’, Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 201–15, and 
‘The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (II)’, Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 287–303. For his 
recent and most developed version of the argument see his The Wisdom to Doubt (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), Chaps. 9 and 10.
2 Schellenberg The Wisdom to Doubt, pp. 204–206.
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In this paper I focus on the notion of the capability of a person to be 
the object of divine love and to engage in personal relational love with God 
in order to show that Schellenberg has incorrect expectations of divine 
love and the human–divine relationship. He has dismissed the vital role 
that God expects us (human beings) to play in our relationship with 
God. In this regard, I shall try to answer the following three questions:
(1) What type of love is required in order for us to have a personal 
reciprocal relationship with God?
(2) Is it legitimate to ascribe this type of love to God? And under what 
conditions?
(3) If it is legitimate to ascribe to God a  type of love that requires 
a  personal reciprocal relationship, then what would be the 
conditions of the object of this type of love? In other words, who 
is capable of being in the reciprocal love relationship with God?
The paper is organized as follows. First, I shall briefly explain different 
concepts of divine love, and then I  shall show that, drawing from 
Nygren’s account, one can distinguish two categories of divine love: 
eros and agape.3 I  shall show that eros, but not agape, as divine love, 
requires a personal reciprocal relationship and union with God. Then 
I shall answer some of the main objections to attributing eros to God, 
namely the Aristotelian and Platonic objections. Finally, I shall interpret 
Schellenberg’s argument according to both types of divine love (eros and 
agape) in order to show that in neither of these forms is his first premise 
compelling, because agape does not require a reciprocal relationship and 
eros requires a high standard of capability for the object of love, which 
normal human beings lack unless they make sufficient efforts to obtain 
it. In other words, merely being non-resistant to God is not enough.
3 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. Watson (London: Society for 
Promoting Christian Knowledge [SPCK], 1982). It is worth noting that Nygren here 
distinguishes three types of divine love: eros (the Hellenistic concept of divine love), 
nomos (the Old Testament concept of divine love), and agape (the truly Christian 
concept of divine love). He tries to show that both eros and nomos require some special 
capabilities and admirable values on the part of the object of love, while agape is a type 
of God’s love that cannot be contained within the framework of the Law (like nomos), 
and is not justified on the ground of merit (like eros), but is based on free grace and 
groundless, spontaneous, and unmotivated divine love. In this paper I use the important 
difference between eros and agape to construct an objection to Schellenberg’s argument; 
I think that nomos can be regarded as a token of the eros-type of divine love, broadly 
speaking because it is based on a sort of value inherent in the object of love as well.
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II. DIVINE LOVE
It is not surprising that Schellenberg constructs his argument based 
on certain expectations that people may have of a  loving God given 
the immense importance of this subject in the Christian tradition. So 
essential to Christianity is the notion of divine love that it seems no 
exaggeration to describe it as the heart of the Christian faith. ‘God is love 
and whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in them.’4 These words, 
from the first letter of John, powerfully express the Christian image of the 
relationship between God and humanity. In the same chapter, John also 
offers a kind of summary of the Christian concept of the human–human 
relationship on that basis: ‘Dear friends, let us love one another, for love 
comes from God. Everyone who loves has been born of God and knows 
God. Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love.’5
The claim that God is love can be interpreted in at least two different 
ways. It can be regarded as expressing the idea that (a) God is the source 
or origin of love from which all lovers derive their love; love is a  gift 
from God to human beings, and God causes, gives and inspires love in 
us, but ‘lover’ is not a proper attribute of God, or (b) God Himself is the 
one who loves and He loves us, as well.6 The first interpretation is not 
our concern here because it deals with the cause of human beings’ love 
towards God or other beings, while here we are dealing with God’s love 
toward human beings.
The New Testament word for God’s generous love is ‘agape’. This 
comes from the Greek translation of the Hebrew word ‘ahaba’ in the Song 
of Songs, and subsequently became a typical expression for the Biblical 
notion of love. The term ‘agape’ refers to God’s love for all humans and all 
creatures regardless of their righteousness or depravity. Agape is God’s 
disinterested love; God loves in an agapeic manner because of His nature, 
for He is essentially loving – for He is love. It is not the case that love is 
merely one of the activities of God, such that God might act lovingly 
in some cases and not in others; rather, love is the essential activity of 
God, in the sense that all of His actions should be interpreted according 
to His love. Every activity of God is loving activity, and all His relations 
with men are characterized by His love. God loves, in the sense of agape, 
4 I John 4: 16.
5 I John 4: 7–8.
6 For more details on these interpretations and the relation between them, see 
Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 41–5.
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all of His creatures, indifferent to their goodness or badness.7 Agape is 
generous, spontaneous, and unmotivated love for all creatures.
However, many believe that we can also ascribe what some have 
called an ‘acquisitive’ type of love to God;8 I shall use the familiar historic 
term ‘eros’ to refer to this type of divine love, by drawing a  contrast 
with the other type of divine love that is generous and unconditional. 
Historically, the word ‘eros’ refers to attentive, mutual, reciprocal (that 
is: seeking reciprocity), and even indulgent or egocentric love. The term 
comes from the ancient Greek notion of erotic love, in which a  man 
longs to acquire what is valuable in his eyes, something that he does not 
possess but desires to have. Eros, so defined, as the desire for union with 
the beloved, is egocentric love and is rooted in our needs and weakness. 
It seems that eros is a result of valuing and appreciating what the lover 
already lacks or needs.9
Based on this narrow interpretation, eros could potentially include 
a defective element – and, indeed, because of the distinctively human 
flaws that undergird it, Nygren explains that the notion of divine love 
cannot possibly be interpreted in the sense of eros. On a properly Christian 
conception, he contends, agape is the only acceptable interpretation of 
God’s love towards His creatures.10
Nygren goes further than criticizing the idea that divine love be 
considered as eros: he also proposes that should the human desire for 
union with God be interpreted in such a manner, it would be infected 
with egocentricity. Such an interpretation, he maintains, should therefore 
7 See Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp. 108–117.
8 It seems noteworthy that if we try to place God and humanity in a relationship of 
love where God is the lover and humanity the beloved, we are likely to start by comparing 
the two in terms of superiority and inferiority, or bestowal and reception. It seems that 
there is nothing that we, as humans, can be in a position to supply for God; nor is there 
anything that we have which is not bestowed by God. So, if we accept the dichotomy 
between acquisitive and generous love, we might find ourselves committed to the 
conclusion that since God is perfect and merciful, His love could only be ‘generous’; and, 
conversely, our love toward God can only be ‘acquisitive’. In this paper I am concerned 
with the dichotomy between these two different types of love: the acquisitive (eros) and 
generous (agape) types of love. In due course I shall refer to some of the proponents of 
the ‘acquisitive’ interpretation of God’s love.
9 Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp. 158–182.
10 For more on this dichotomy and the concept of divine love in other monotheistic 
traditions, see Benyamin Abrahamov, Divine Love in Islamic Mysticism: The Teachings of 
al-Ghazâlî and al-Dabbâgh (London: Routledge, 2011), ch. 1.
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be dismissed. On this basis, Nygren criticizes all kinds of Gnostic and 
mystical practices from the history of religion, claiming that they are 
ill-formed.11 Agape, he emphasizes, is the only sense in which the New 
Testament concept of love can be interpreted.
However, on the basis of an examination of all the uses of the word 
‘agape’ in the New Testament and early Christian texts, Catherine 
Osborne tries to show that in many cases divine love can be interpreted 
as eros. She criticizes Nygren’s concept of the pure Christian concept of 
love, showing how the authors of the New Testament were influenced by 
Greek and Hebrew terminology and background knowledge inherited 
along with it.12
The possibility that Christian Scripture provides a  basis for 
interpreting divine love as both eros and agape is also raised by Alvin 
Plantinga.13 He emphasizes that there are some scriptural images that 
permit us to ascribe eros to God, and that his love is not exclusively 
agapeic. He argues that Scripture presents this kind of divine eros as 
existing within the subjects of the Trinity, especially Jesus. Plantinga 
cites Isaiah 62: 5: ‘As a bridegroom rejoices over his bride God rejoices 
over you.’14 The bridegroom rejoicing over his bride does not love her 
with a merely agapeic love, Plantinga explains: ‘He desires and longs for 
something outside himself, namely union with His beloved.’15
Despite these theological responses, I  think Nygren’s objections to 
attributing eros to God are worthy of further philosophical investigation. 
To reach a better understanding of how eros can be attributed to God we 
shall scrutinize the notion of eros, its roots, the definition of it, and the 
criterion under which it can be attributed to God. The first questions that 
should be addressed in this regard are: How can eros, whose ultimate aim 
is the union with the beloved, be attributed to God? And what criteria 
would something have to meet to be an object of eros, if the lover is God? 
In what follows, I shall explore Aquinas’ answer to this question; I shall 
then try to answer some of the objections to viewing eros as a form of 
divine love.
11 Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp. 190–220.
12 Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled, chs. 1 and 2.
13 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 311–323.
14 Isaiah 62:5.
15 Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 320.
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To be clear: what I  am going to suggest regarding the sketched 
dichotomy between the agape and eros interpretations of divine love, is 
that even if, contra Nygren, we accept that divine love can be interpreted 
as eros, Schellenberg’s argument still doesn’t work. If divine love is purely 
agape, then Schellenberg’s argument is in trouble, for God’s capacity to 
love us agapeically is obviously entirely independent of anything about 
us, including the level of hiddenness or non-hiddenness of God from 
us. If God’s love were purely agape, as Nygren suggests, Schellenberg’s 
argument would fail. But it seems to me that it is plausible to think of God’s 
love as eros in at least some senses. I shall now go on to consider these 
and show that even if God’s love is eros in these senses, Schellenberg’s 
argument still fails.
III. DIVINE LOVE AIMS AT UNION WITH THE BELOVED
In addition to the generous type of love that is love for the sake of the 
beloved regardless of her intrinsic values, Aquinas distinguishes a type 
of love that aims at union with the beloved when a lover not only wishes 
some good for the beloved but also loves the relationship with the beloved 
to whom he wishes good.16 For Aquinas, the desire for this love is rooted 
in the joy of union with the beloved, because ‘every lover rejoices at 
being united to the beloved’.17 However, Aquinas focuses primarily on 
the union between man and God as the result of our love towards God. 
He thinks that the ultimate good for any human person is union with 
God.18 This kind of idea should, in fact, be considered the motivation for 
various mystical practices in the Christian tradition. However, when we 
talk about God’s desire for union with human beings – and in particular 
when we attribute eros to God – the idea of union seems problematic. 
What does it mean to say that God desires union with us? When we 
understand divine love as agape, and thereby dwell on God’s benevolence 
and His desire for the good of human beings regardless of our goodness 
or badness (what Aquinas named the simple view of love), there seems 
to be no problem. Nonetheless, the exact question that I shall pursue is: 
If it were legitimate to ascribe eros to God, what would be the nature of 
the union desired and the conditions for bringing it about?
16 ST I-II q.26 a.4 (NY: Cosimo, trans. Fathers of English Dominican Province, 2007, 
originally published 1912).
17 ST I-II q.70 a.3.
18 See, for example, ST I-II q.1 a.8.
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As mentioned, Aquinas distinguishes two different sorts of love, 
the desire for the good of the beloved and the desire for union with 
the beloved, which in the case of divine love I  have classified under 
the categories of agape and eros respectively. Here I focus on the more 
problematic part of this account, which interprets the erotic element of 
divine love as God desiring union with us, human beings.
Reflecting on this form of love, Eleonore Stump explains that two 
things seem to be required for union between persons: personal presence 
and mutual closeness.19 Personal presence includes not only causal and 
cognitive contact between the lover and the beloved, but also their 
conscious awareness of and shared attention to each other. Mutual 
closeness is what strengthens the required shared attention and mutual 
awareness, in a sense that the lover and the beloved become completely 
engaged with each other. Mutual closeness in the case of two persons can 
hardly be reduced to propinquity or even lively conversational relations: 
it seems to include sharing thoughts and feelings as well. And not just 
any thoughts and feelings will do here: as Stump says, ‘For Paula to be 
close to Jerome, Jerome has to share with Paula those thoughts and 
feelings of his that he cares about and that are revelatory of him. Jerome 
would not be close to Paula if he shared with her a great many of his most 
trivial thoughts but nothing of what was important to him or revealing 
of him.’20
Suppose, however, that Jerome does reveal enough of his thoughts 
and feelings to Paula; if Paula does not will to understand Jerome’s self-
revelation, or is not able to understand what he is trying to reveal, she 
will not be close to him. So, mutual closeness requires self-revelation 
on the part of the lover and the will for reception and the ability of 
comprehension of the received material on the part of the beloved.21
In the case of divine love toward human beings, it seems that 
according to Theistic religions, God meets both of the conditions for 
allowing human beings to be in union with Him: God is omnipresent, 
and has causal relations with and direct and unmediated cognitive access 
to everything. In addition, God is always and everywhere in a position 
to pay attention to any creature able and willing to share attention with 
19 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 6.
20 Ibid., p. 119.
21 Ibid.
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Him. God also has self-disclosed Himself to be known by us in revelation 
and creation. He has revealed certain truths about Himself through 
His prophets and messengers in history, and has revealed (some truths 
about) His mind and will to human beings. For these reasons, God has 
disclosed Himself to fulfil His desire for union with human beings.
But the crucial question that arises is whether God’s desire for union 
with human beings is sufficient for our being in a reciprocal relationship 
of love and union with God. Contra Schellenberg, my answer is ‘No’, 
because, as mentioned, in addition to divine omnipresence and self-
disclosure, union requires three things on the part of the beloved. First, 
it requires the beloved’s attention to God’s presence. This I  shall term 
praying: praying seems to be a  way in which we can achieve shared 
attention with God in a  way that man wholeheartedly pays attention 
to God and asks Him for whatever he needs and has a sense that God 
hears and sees him and pays attention to him. Second, union requires the 
beloved’s will to understand the divine presence in His creatures through 
His revelations. And third, it requires the beloved’s ability to comprehend 
divine self-disclosure in His revelation. The second and third conditions 
require thinking and reflection on revelation and Scripture, in addition 
to continuous repentance for the sins which lead us astray. So it seems 
that praying, repentance, and reflection on divine revelation are three 
prerequisites for us to respond to God’s eros. These are three conditions 
which must be met by the beloved man if God’s desire for union with 
him is to be satisfied.
Furthermore, these things may be taken to be a matter of degree. The 
more a human being becomes purified and sanctified, the stronger the 
relation of eros he can have with God. How close God becomes to any 
one person depends on how much that person tries to pray, repent, and 
be open to the divine free gift. God’s grace is free for all of us, but our 
success in availing ourselves of it depends on us.
In this way, it seems that eros can be attributed to God and yet 
Schellenberg’s argument still not work. What we find, then, through 
reasoning and consideration of the concept of love in Christianity, is that 
while every human being is the potential object of God’s eros, in fact 
only meritorious human beings can reach the state of union with their 
Lord.22
22 There is a long-running debate in the literature regarding the notion of divine grace 
and whether humanity merits the gifts of God. Nevertheless, my contention here is that 
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I  have argued, then, that whilst it is plausible to consider God’s 
love as eros as well as agape, and thus that the ‘quick’ way to sidestep 
Schellenberg’s argument (that of simply denying any erotic element 
in the divine love towards His creatures) is blocked, the sort of erotic 
element supposed to be present in God’s love towards His creatures is 
nevertheless not sufficient to support Schellenberg. In the next part 
I shall therefore consider and respond to some Aristotelian and Platonic 
objections to construing divine love as eros in any sense, in order to 
shore up my implicit suggestion that the Christian is in fact best advised 
to allow an  element of eros into his or her conception of divine love, 
rather than simply take the ‘quick’ way with Schellenberg’s argument.
IV. THE PLATONIC OBJECTION TO ATTRIBUTING EROS TO GOD
As defined, eros involves desire for union with the beloved, and is 
a matter of longing, perceiving, noting, appreciating, delighting in, and 
relishing. A  primary question then, is: May eros be ascribed to God? 
As I shall explain, from a Platonic point of view, it seems that eros may 
hardly be supposed a suitable interpretation of divine love.23
Traditionally, every discussion of love – whether celestial, romantic, 
ascending, or descending love – begins with Plato. His ideas on love are 
expressed mainly in the Symposium, Lysis, and the Phaedo. While in the 
Symposium Socrates reports the views of Diotima of Mantinea, a wise 
woman, philosopher, and mystic, in the two other books Socrates himself 
is the main interlocutor. In the Symposium Socrates reports his dialogue 
with Diotima regarding the nature of love and its effects. Diotima, we 
are told, declares that eros is not a god but at most a daemon or spirit, 
an intermediary between gods and mortals. According to Plato, Eros is 
a son of Poros (the symbol of resources, wealth, and possessions) and 
Penia (the symbol of poverty).
So because Eros is the son of Poros and Penia, his situation is in some 
such case as this. First of all, he is always poor; and he is far from being 
only meritorious human beings are capable of being in union with God, regardless of the 
way a human being may achieve such a meritorious character, and no matter whether it 
is itself through grace of God or not.
23 Catherine Osborne examines this claim in detail and concludes that because Plato 
intentionally uses direct quotes from Diotima it is better to ascribe this claim to her 
rather than Plato or Socrates. See Osborne, Eros Unveiled, pp. 86–116.
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tender and beautiful, as many believe, but is tough, squalid, shoeless, 
and homeless, [...] he has the nature of his mother, always dwelling with 
neediness. But in accordance with his father he plots to trap the beautiful 
and the good, and is courageous, stout, [...] desirous of practical wisdom 
and inventive.24
But of course deficiencies and shortages cannot be attributed to God. 
‘How then could he who is without a  share in the beautiful and good 
things be a god?’ Diotima asks; and Socrates replies: ‘In no way it seems.’25
From this passage one may conclude that for Plato, eros cannot be 
an attribute of God.26 Following Robert Adams, I will summarize Plato’s 
argument (to the effect that eros is not an attribute of God) as follows:27
(1) Eros involves desire for its object.
(2) One desires what one needs and does not have.
(3) Thus, the object of eros is what one needs or lacks.
(4) Eros, especially the gods’ eros if they have any, will have things 
beautiful and good as its object.
(5) God cannot lack such things or be needy in respect of goodness 
and beauty.
(6) Thus, eros is incompatible with deity.
Adams, responding to Plato’s argument, argues that eros can be regarded 
as a  model of divine love concerning finite things. He objects that 
neediness and desire is not essential to eros because its central feature is 
valuing, and desire is only one possible expression of valuing. According 
to Adams, the essential content of eros would be a  kind of liking, 
admiration, and appreciation, and not necessarily the desire or longing 
that implies the absence of the desirable/longed-for element. Then eros 
would be a model of the divine love God expresses when He admires and 
appreciates the good acts and character of His servants. Thus eros can be 
attributed to God without attributing any deficiency or neediness to Him.
I  think this reply to Plato’s objection is inconclusive. The ‘value-
appraisal’ account of love, which seems to be what Adams has in mind, 
24 Symposium (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 
1980), 203 b–d.
25 Ibid., 202 c5–d7.
26 Here it should be noted that eros as an emotion or state of mind takes its name 
from Eros, the person or a demon. In some phrases these two are used indistinguishably.
27 Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 133.
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is just one sort of eros alongside the union account. I agree with Adams 
that we can ascribe the value-appraisal type of eros to God, because it is 
certain that God admires and appreciates good and admirable beings. 
However, if this was all that there is to God’s erotic love, eros as divine 
love toward human beings reduces to God’s appreciation of good human 
characters and attributes. And consequently the objects of divine eros 
are only those creatures who instantiate these virtues, for they alone 
are worthy of God’s appreciation and admiration. It seems that God 
may be pictured as having the desire for being in union with all of us, 
independently of whether or not and to what extent He appreciates us.
Perhaps we can respond to Plato’s objection in a  different way, by 
examining the relation between neediness and desire. We can, perhaps, 
distinguish between two kinds of desire: one may desire something as 
a means to one’s own ends (as a sort of neediness); or one may desire 
something as a means to the beloved’s end.28 It is in the second sense that 
we should understand God’s desire for union with human beings. If, as 
Aquinas proposes, the goal of human creation is union with God, then it 
seems plausible that the benevolent God also desires that we achieve this 
union with Him. In this case it is not required to ascribe any neediness to 
God. Although it is true that needs and desires are commonly associated, 
they are nonetheless not correlative. It is possible to need something (for 
example, a reform in one’s eating habits) without desiring it; but it is also 
possible to desire something only for the fulfilment of the desire for the 
good of the object of desire (for example, that those one hears on the 
news are suffering from famine in a faraway country receive food).
There is another objection to the attribution of eros to God, however, 
this one based on ideas from Aristotle. In the following section I shall 
examine this objection.
V. THE ARISTOTELIAN OBJECTION TO DIVINE LOVE FOR US
Aristotle seems to have thought of God as so absorbed in self-
contemplation as to have no concern for lesser beings.29 For Aristotle, 
God’s self-contemplation and self-love is the origin of creation of other 
28 There may also be a type of desire without caring about the end of desire – desire for 
the sake of desire itself. But it seems eccentric to attribute this to God.
29 This is a  common interpretation of Book Lambda of his Metaphysics (Penguin 
Classics, trans. Hough Lawson-Tancred, 1999), 1074b15–1075a11.
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beings. But are we to understand his view as the view that God is so 
absorbed in self-contemplation and self-love that He has no concern or 
thought at all for lesser beings? Why should divine self-contemplation 
block God from bestowing attention and love on other creatures? It seems 
that we have no reason to conclude from the Aristotelian arguments 
that, while God always engages in self-contemplation, He cannot pay 
attention to other beings.
The proponent of the Aristotelian argument can improve his 
objection, however, by saying that what blocks God from desiring union 
with lesser beings is the possibility of vulnerability, which is associated 
with love. God would put Himself at risk if He came to love other beings. 
Vulnerability and risk are associated with the sort of desire the satisfaction 
of which is to some extent out of the control of the lover. Insofar as the 
fulfilment of God’s desire to be in union with human beings is at least 
in part within human beings’ control, God’s having a desire for union 
with us makes God vulnerable to us. But, the objection continues, God 
is self-sufficient and sovereign, and thus nothing that matters to God is 
dependent on anything human beings do. Therefore, it is not possible to 
attribute eros to God, at least in the sense that eros includes God’s desire 
for union with us.30
I think this objection is not yet compelling. It seems plausible that the 
sovereign God can freely choose to create a creature that has free will, 
and that the existence of creatures with free will then necessitates their 
having free choices and actions. Thus far, their free actions seem not to 
be in contradiction with divine sovereignty; however, if God desires that 
the free creatures freely choose something that is good for them, then 
this divine desire does indeed makes God vulnerable to their actions. 
It seems true then that God, if He desires union with us, is vulnerable 
to our actions; but this can hardly be considered as incompatible with 
divine sovereignty; it was His free choice to create free creatures in the 
first place and at any stage, should He so choose, He could remove their 
freedom. At least this much seems to be conceded even by many of those 
who argue against the free-will defence in response to the problem of 
evil. God’s ‘vulnerability’ could be interpreted as something like God’s 
disappointment in or concern for evildoers.
As a  result, for our purpose in this paper it can be concluded that 
eros  – including both God’s admiration for good persons and God’s 
30 See Stump, Wandering in Darkness, pp. 122–3.
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desire for union with all of us – is a possible interpretation of an aspect of 
divine love. It is not then that God loves us solely agapeically. However, as 
I have noted, according to the union account of eros, the two conditions 
of personal presence and closeness must be fulfilled by human beings as 
well. And this is sufficient to block Schellenbeg’s argument.
VI. REASSESSMENT OF SCHELLENBERG’S ARGUMENT
In previous sections, I have accepted the idea that divine love has two 
main aspects, agape and eros; while agape is generous and unmotivated 
love, and involves benevolence, mercy, and compassion for all creatures 
regardless of their value, eros is attentive and responsive love, and 
involves liking, longing, admiration, and desire for union with the 
beloved. However, union with the beloved requires mutual closeness 
and personal presence. Mutual closeness and personal presence can be 
obtained only if the lover and the beloved do what is necessary for this. 
Then, the responsibility of human beings to respond to God’s desire for 
union must necessitate not only his non-resistance to God but also his 
reflection on divine revelation, repentance, and praying.
Based on these premises, and by distinguishing eros and agape as two 
conceptions of divine love, I  am now in a  position to go through the 
formalization of Schellenberg’s premise 1, first replacing love with eros, 
and then replacing love with agape, showing more formally than I have 
hitherto how the argument fails in both cases. Schellenberg’s premise 1 
can be summarized in the following statement:
S(a): If the loving God of theism exists, then, necessarily, His agapeic love 
ensures that all persons who are not resisting a relationship with Him 
will be in a position to participate in developing relationship with Him.
Obviously S(a) cannot be demonstrated, because God’s love as agape 
does not necessarily entail any personal relationship whatsoever. Divine 
love as agape is like rain for all creatures: it falls on the just and unjust 
alike; it is not responsive to anything in the beloved and does not require 
any reciprocal relationship.  If we accept agape as the interpretation of 
divine love it can straightforwardly be seen that Schellenberg’s argument 
does not work. Of course, one may claim that divine agape necessitates 
divine eros in the sense that God, by His generous love toward all of us, 
bestows upon us what is required on our part to establish a relationship 
of reciprocal love with Him and to come into union with Him. One 
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may thus expect that God, the perfectly loving, would provide us with 
whatever we need for our flourishing and growth toward our aim of 
union with Him, including the belief that He exists. But my answer 
to this is twofold. First, I  suggest, there is an ambiguity in this sort of 
expectation. We should distinguish between two kinds of expectation we 
may have of God’s agapeic love: one may expect God to provide human 
beings with whatever they need to reach their ultimate goal; or one may 
expect God to provide whatever they need to be in their ultimate good 
state. The former expectation – which considers God’s purpose for the 
creation of human beings – is the only one that seems tenable, since it is 
a common claim of theists that God loves perfectly, but that God is also 
perfectly just and perfectly rational. God’s love, then, would have to be 
calibrated to that degree compatible with the other properties essential to 
divine perfection. Divine love will not have the consequence the objector 
expects if that consequence is incompatible with divine rationality and 
justice. In theological terms, there is a venerable tradition which holds 
that grace is necessary for one to appreciate the evidence in support of 
theism, but (and this is an important but), grace is a divine gift of which 
justice precludes a universal distribution. God could give everybody the 
belief in His existence (as perhaps He did for angels); but His purpose 
for our creation is, perhaps, that He expects us to acquire this belief in 
other ways.
Second, and undeniably, the best sort of love respects the choices of 
its object. Thus, God, who is perfect in love, would prefer not to coerce 
us to return His love. Moreover, were God to override our wills in this 
regard, our love of Him would not be freely chosen. So God would prefer 
us to come to believe in Him and then reciprocate His love on our own.
We can see, then, that if we think of love in Schellenberg’s argument as 
agape, his argument fails. By substituting eros for divine love in premise 
S we have:
S(e): If the loving God of theism exists, then, necessarily, His eros ensures 
that all persons who are not resisting a relationship with Him will be in 
a position to participate in a developing relationship with Him.
My claim now is that even though it is in itself reasonable (contra Plato 
and Aristotle) to think of divine love as having an erotic element, S(e) 
cannot be defended. For whilst it is true that eros requires a reciprocal 
relationship, it is not the case that every normal human being who is 
non-resistant can be engaged in divine eros. If my argument is correct, 
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it is not the case that only nonresistance or even non-culpability is 
sufficient for being engaged in union with God. One actually has to do 
something in addition, and not everyone who is nonresistant and non-
culpable does do this thing – repent, pray, and reflect on revelation.
Therefore, Schellenberg’s main premise is defeated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Schellenberg argues that God does not exist because God’s love requires 
a mutual relationship in which He cannot be hidden to those who are 
nonresistant, and yet it seems that God is hidden to some nonresistant 
nonbelievers. In this paper this argument is undermined by showing that 
God’s love does not require that He be unhidden. If God’s love is agape, 
God’s love does not require Him to be unhidden from anyone. If His love 
is eros, it will only require Him to be unhidden from those who satisfy 
certain further conditions.
My objection was presented through an examination of Schellenberg’s 
use of the notion of divine love in his argument. First, he uses the 
notion of divine love without paying sufficient attention to its different 
aspects and dimensions. Second, he ignores the point that it is the eros 
interpretation of divine love that requires reciprocal relationship, and 
that eros requires certain qualifications on the part of the creatures who 
are its object. Third, and most importantly, he treats the capability to 
have a  relationship to God as a  very simple capability that everybody 
who is capable of having normal human relationships possesses. He pays 
no attention to the sophisticated, long, and hard path of the mystical 
journey toward perfection that, in the history of mankind, only a very 
few men and women have properly traversed.31
31 Thanks for wise counsel and penetrating comments to Muhammad Legenhausen, 
Tim Mawson, Mahmoud Morvarid, Richard Swinburne and Hamid Vahid.
